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INTRODUCTION
JOHN L. HILL*

I was very pleased to be asked to write the introduction to this issue of
the Journal, since what now has become known as consumer law has

been an area of personal interest and concern to me both as a trial
lawyer in private practice and as attorney general.
My private practice was primarily what is commonly referred to as a
"plaintiff's practice"- that is, I represented persons injured by another's conduct in suits for damages. While most of my cases dealt with
claims of personal injury, I was frequently asked, either by clients whom
I was already representing in a personal injury action or by persons
seeking legal assistance from me for the first time, to help them in what
would now be called a "consumer case." The actual facts of each of
these cases are not important here. What is important, however, is that
each had a common characteristic-the amount in controversy was
generally very small, normally not more than two hundred dollars.
These losses were simply too small to justify the costs of litigation.'
Although the common law of fraud permitted an award of "exemplary
damages" over and above actual damages,2 most cases did not involve
the element of intentional deception that had to be shown before exemplary damages could be awarded. Furthermore, if exemplary damages
* Attorney General of Texas; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney General Hill
has twice served as chairman of the consumer protection committee of the National Association of Attorneys General.
1. For discussions of the inhibiting effect of cost on consumer litigation see D.
AAKER & G. DAY, CONSUMERISM: SEARCH FOR THE CONSUMER INTEREST 363-65
(1974); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967); P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY:

1965 at 59-62 (1965); Comment, TranslatingSympathy for Deceived into Effective Program for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 403 (1966).
2. See Gale v. Spriggs, 346 S.W.2d 620, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ
ref'd n.r&.).
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were found not to be "reasonable" in relation to the plaintiff's actual
damages, the judge would order remittitur of the "excessive" amount to
the defendant.3
The imbalance between litigation costs and potential recovery was not
the only factor that made common law remedies ineffective. First, an
action for fraud required rigorous proof: a material misrepresentation of
fact upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment.4 A
plaintiff could stumble over any one of these proof hurdles and be
denied relief. Further, as noted above, proof of "intent to deceive" was
required for an award of exemplary damages. Proving up a state of
mind-even with strong direct evidence- is painfully difficult. Finally, the defense of "puffing" or "dealer talk"5 which, in the words of
Dean Prosser, allowed a salesman "to lie his head off, so long as he
[said] nothing specific,"" constituted a major hurdle to success.
Contract law was no better, since by artful construction of printed
contract clauses the seller could so limit the buyer's remedies as to rule
out effective court action. 7 The only stopgap for this practice was the
doctrine of unconscionability,8 which permitted a court to void a
patently unreasonable contract clause. Unfortunately, the doctrine of
unconscionability was available only as a defense and not as an affirmative cause of action. Few consumer debtors would risk defending an
action in the hope that their contracts would be declared "unconscionable," and again, the costs of asserting the defense made it all but
illusory.
Because of these two problems-proof requirements and litigation
costs-I was forced to turn down many cases even though they were
meritorious. Turning down these cases was made even more difficult
for me since there was virtually no place to send these aggrieved
consumers for help. The Federal Trade Commission, until recently,9
3. Irwin v. Whirley, 538 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
4. See, e.g., McCall v. Trucks, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brady v. Johnson, 512 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
5. See, e.g., Saunders v. Martin, 390 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1965, no writ); 25 TEX. JuR. 2d Fraudand Deceit § 47 (1961).
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 723 (4th ed. 1971).
7. The UCC permits both the exclusion or modification of warranties and the
modification or limitation of remedies. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.316, .719
(Tex. UCC 1968); Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Damages for
Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TExAs L. Rnv. 60 (1974).
8. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC 1968). See generally
G. KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, EQurrY 227-30 (1976).
9. The Magnuson-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), amended
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could initially issue only an administrative cease and desist order and
then only after a lengthy administrative hearing and possible appeal."0
Furthermore, the Commission was, and still is, generally interested in
bringing legal or administrative action where there are numerous consumers affected by the allegedly unlawful practice." Many one-time
consumer abuses do not reach this threshold.
State enforcement machinery was likewise inadequate. The first
"deceptive trade practices act" was passed in 1967 as part of legislation
dealing principally with consumer credit. 2 Thirteen specific acts or
practices were declared unlawful, and the Consumer Credit Commissioner was authorized to request the attorney general to seek injunctions.'
The statute also provided for civil penalties of one thousand
dollars per violation but only for violation of an injunction.' 4 A broad
exemption provision immunized any "actions or transactions permitted
under laws administered by a public official acting under statutory
authority of this State or the United States."'" No provision for, or
mention of, private remedies was made.
This legislation was amended in 1969 in several significant ways.' 6
First, a general prohibition of all "[flalse, misleading, or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade and commerce" was added to
the thirteen specifically prohibited practices, and Texas courts were
directed to Federal Trade Commission and federal court interpretations
of section 5 (a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act for guidance
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (Supp. V 1975), to permit the
FTC to sue for civil penalties where the violation of the FTC rule in question was committed "with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that [the violative conduct] is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by [the]
rule [in question]." Id. § 45(m)(1)(A). The Act also provided that knowing violators
of cease and desist orders could be sued for civil penalties even though they were not
formally subject to the cease and desist order in question. id. § 45(m) (1) (B).
10. Civil penalites of $5,000 were only available against those who violated cease
and desist orders issued against them. 15 U.S.C. ,§45(1) (1970).

11. Importantly, the Magnuson-Moss Act amended the Federal Trade Commission
Act to expand the FTC's jurisdiction from acts or practices "in" interstate commerce
to those "in or affecting" interstate commerce.

15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 45(a)(1), 46, 52

(Supp. V 1975). Still, Commission action must be predicated on the substantial effect
the act or practice in question has on the public interest. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643, 646-47 (1931); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); 2 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISiNO § 34.02[2][b] (1976).

12. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 274, § 2 at 608, 658.
13. Id. at 658-59.
14. Id. at 659.

15. Id. at 658.
16. Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 452, § 1, at 1504.
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in construing the general prohibition.1" Second, prelitigation investigative powers and the authority to accept an "assurance of voluntary
compliance" without filing suit were given to the Consumer Credit
Commissioner and penalties were increased to ten thousand dollars for
each violation of an injunction. 18 What seemed like a great step
forward in strengthening enforcement was more than offset by the
addition of three more exemptions to the already broad exclusion provided in 1967. Now immunized from prosecution was the insurance
industry; advertising media, absent a showing that the intent or purpose
of the advertiser was known by the advertising medium's owner or
personnel; and any conduct that was subject to and compliant with the
regulations and statutes administered by the FTC.19 Like the 1967
legislation, the 1969 amendments failed to extend a private remedy to
those victimized by deceptive practices; instead, it was expressly provided that "[n]othing in this Chapter either charges or diminishes the
rights of parties in private litigation."20
Therefore, when I became attorney general in January 1973, I realized that my first major task was to improve Texas law to better protect
the consumer. Needed was both strengthened public enforcement tools
and the creation of an effective private remedy. With the drafting
assistance of now Senator Lloyd Doggett, who was then President of the
Texas Consumer Association, the hard legislative work of the bill's able
sponsors, Senators Oscar Mauzy and A. R. "Babe" Schwartz in the
Senate and then House member, now Senator, Carl Parker in the
House, and with the support of such diverse organizations as the Texas
Retail Federation, the Texas AFL-CIO, and the Texas Junior Bar, we
devised and passed the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act of 197321 [DTPA].

It became law on May 21, 1973.

The DTPA represented a marked departure from past law. Substantively, much of the old law was kept intact. The general prohibition
against "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" and the reference to FTC rules and regulations were retained.22 Most of the old list
of specifically prohibited practices was reenacted, but nine new items
were added, bringing the number of prohibitions on the new "laundry
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1505.
Id. at 1506-08.
Id. at 1,505.
Id. at 1505.
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Supp. 1976-1977).
Id. § 17.46(a), (c).
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list" to twenty.2" Importantly, three of the four exemptions were
abolished, leaving only the media with a limited immunity.24
The DTPA's most significant contribution, however, was in the area
of remedies. The Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office, rather than the Consumer Credit Commissioner, was given
primary authority to enforce the Act and could now seek, not only an
injunction, but also civil penalties from two thousand dollars per violation up to a maximum of ten thousand dollars in the original enforcement action against the defendant. 25 Additionally, the Consumer Protection Division was given the power to seek restitution or actual
damages on behalf of identifiable persons injured by the wrongful
conduct of the defendant. 21 Most importantly, the legislature, recognizing the inadequacies of common law remedies, provided a private cause
of action for treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees for any consumer "adversely affected" by a deceptive trade practice, a breach of
an express or implied warranty, any "unconscionable action or course
of action," or by any violation of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 7
By extending to the consumer the same cause of action for deceptive
practices formerly available only to the attorney general, the DTPA
substantially lightened the burden of proof required of the consumer in
common law actions for fraud. The FTC interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which Texas courts were instructed by the
DTPA to follow, had already abandoned the requirement of "intent to
deceive" and "reliance." Representations and advertisements are unlawful regardless of the intent of the seller if they have the "capacity" or
"tendency" to deceive; actual deception is not required.2 8 Moreover,
conduct has the capacity to deceive even if the reasonable or intelligent
buyer would not have been misled. If the conduct could mislead the
"ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous," it violates the law. 29
Thus, the defense of "puffing" was substantially curtailed. 0 Similarly,
23. Id.§ 17.46(b).
24. Id.§ 17.49(a).
25. Id.4 17.47(a), (c).
26. Id.§ 17.47(d).
27. Id.§ 17.50(a), (b)(1).
28. Goodman v. FTC 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944); FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co.,
81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1935); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
30. See In re Better Living, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 648, 653 (1957), af/fd, 259 F.2d 271
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the "materiality" of the misrepresentation, while recognized as a factor
by the FTC, is of no real consequence."' Significantly, any waiver of
the remedies in the DTPA was declared "void and unenforceable."
While extending a new cause of action to the consumer, the DTPA did
not seek to repeal the consumer's right to bring a common law fraud
action. Section 17.43 provided quite clearly that the DTPA's provisions
are not "exclusive" and its remedies "are in addition to any other
procedures or remedies provided for in any other law."
Having overcome the first hurdle to effective private redress for consumer deception-the burden of proof, the new DTPA addressed
the second hurdle-the disincentive to litigate arising from the imbalance between the high cost and practical difficulties of litigation
and the small "actual" damages characteristic of most consumer claims.
The obvious answer was to provide for an award of multiple damages, in addition to court costs and attorneys' fees, to the consumer
who prevails in a lawsuit so that the consumer would be encouraged to
seek private resolution of his grievance. A new mechanism was required to accomplish this purpose. As noted, exemplary damages
would not suffice 82 since the plaintiff could never be sure that the trier
of fact would ultimately find the requisite degree of culpability on the
defendant's part8" or of the amount of exempary damages he would
ultimately be awarded, as that decision is left to the jury to be decided in
light of the particular facts of the case at hand. 4 To remove this
uncertainty the legislature created the automatic trebling mechanism of
section 17.50(b)(1). Now the consumer would be assured from the
outset that if he proved a cause of action under section 17.50(a), he
would receive three times his actual damages.
All of the features of common law fraud that had stood in the way of
effective private consumer redress were now gone. The enforcement
mechanisms of the DTPA truly fulfilled the legislative purposes of
(3d Cir. 1958). See also 2 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 18.04
(4) (1976); 2 [1976] TIADE REG. REP. (CCH) %7533, 12,032.
31. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 77 (1934); Moretrench Corp.
v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942). See also Note, Developments in the LawDeceptive Advertising, 80 Hitv. L. REv. 1005, 1056 (1967).
32. In fact, the legislature expressly rejected exemplary damages. When the DTPA
was passed by the House as H.B. 417, it authorized an award of "punitive damages" in
addition to the other remedies now available under § 17.50(b). TEx. H.R.J. 2096
(1973). The Senate deleted this provision and the House concurred. Id. at 5383.
33. See, e.g., Gale v. Spriggs, 346 S.W.2d 620, 625-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Burke v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, no
writ).
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"protect[ing] consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty" and
"provid[ing] efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. '3 ' The injured consumer-armed with a certain, multiple
damage remedy--could now protect himself, thus lessening the demand
for public enforcement actions for restitution and damages.
Armed with these new statutory tools, the Attorney General's Office
has pursued a vigorous and effective enforcement program. Since May
21, 1973, the date the DTPA became effective, as a result of 305 legal
actions (223 lawsuits and 83 assurances of voluntary compliances), the
state has been awarded $298,626 in civil penalties while injured consumers have received $1,030,924 in restitution and other economic
benefits.86 Further, in processing 42,410 complaints since 1973, we
have assisted Texas consumers in actually recovering an additional
$3,214,216 in restitution. Although no statistics on private litigation
are available, there is reason to believe, based on the increasing number
of reported cases, that there is more frequent use of the private treble
damage remedy.
But protection of the consumer does not depend solely on the vigorous use of legal remedies. There must be an increased commitment to
consumer education. All the laws in the world cannot adequately
protect those who lack the most rudimentary skills of the marketplace.
According to a 1975 University of Texas study,37 twenty-one percent of
all Texas adults are either incapable of conducting modern day activities,
such as properly filling out a check, or are doing so with difficulty.
Another thirty-one percent are only minimally competent to handle
day-to-day matters of living. The sad truth is that 2,399,000 Texas
adults are incompetent in basic consumer skills, such as being able to
figure their change from a twenty dollar bill when looking at a cash
register receipt, while 1,682,000 have difficulty figuring how much is
deducted from their paychecks---even with the numbers in front of
35. Tax. Bus. & COMM.

CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Supp. 1976-1977).
36. How effective the State's enforcement program will be in the future depends
largely on the level of financial commitment the state is willing to make. While Texas'

consumer protection budget ranked sixth in the nation in 1973 when compared to their
state attorneys general offices, Texas fell to twenty-second when the state's population,
income, and total retail sales, were taken into account. Bernacchi, Consumer Protection, Is It Worth the Candle?: An Analysis of State Consumer Protection Appropriations, 52 J.URB. L.913, 915, 919, 921 (1975).

37. TEXAs STATE MANPOWER SERVICES COUNCIL AND TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY,
ADULT FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCY IN TEXAs (1975) (report prepared by The Adult Per-

formance Level Project, The University of Texas at Austin, Division of Extension and
Industrial and Business Training Bureau).
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them. Unless we are willing to require basic consumer education and
unless we are willing to foot the bill to make it meaningful, consumers
will never be able to protect themselves adequately from unwise purchases or deceptive sales practices.
For the present, lawyers must become better acquainted with the
developing concepts of consumer law. Lawyers for consumers and
businessmen alike need to know what the legal requirements are and
where the law will likely take us in the future- thus the importance of
this issue of the Journal. It contains, first, a comprehensive treatment
of the public and private rights and remedies under the DTPA. Next is
a discussion of the preservation of consumer claims and defenses, including a discussion of the FTC's new holder-in-due course rule. This
is followed by a related article dealing with the liability of assignees
under the Consumer Credit Code.
On the federal level, recent developments in federal consumer credit
legislation and case law are examined. Such amendments as the addition of leased goods to Truth-in-Lending coverage are presented. Additionally, advertising restrictions on licensed occupations are analyzed
from an antitrust perspective.
Student commentaries deal with landlord-tenant relations, the applicability of the DTPA to professionals, the law relating to debt collection practices, and the various aspects of credit advertising.
The contributors and the editorial staff of the Journal are to be
praised for this ambitious undertaking in an extremely important area of
the law.
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